Chris Patten understates the nature of US engagement on the issue of Tibet, an engagement that the EU could learn from.
This opinion piece was written by ICT’s EU Policy Director Vincent Metten and published by Politico on 3 March 2010.
Chris Patten is right that China’s rise should be good for the world, and he is right too that a strong and co-operative US-Chinese relationship is critical to efforts to tackle global issues effectively (“Is China overplaying its hand?”, 25 February-3 March).
However, Patten is on shaky ground when he characterises as “ritualistic” the US’s recent engagement on Taiwan and Tibet, two issues that both China and the US have shown to be fundamental, though contentious, elements of their relationship. In sidelining the relevance of these issues, Patten misses an opportunity to flag up the US approach – direct, self-interested and reflective of democratic principles – as one that the EU should consider adopting in its own relationship with Beijing.
The sale of arms to Taiwan is undoubtedly the most straightforward of recent actions by the US that have prompted Beijing to protest that Washington is interfering in its internal affairs. The US’s policy towards Taiwan is a matter of law (the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act) and directs that the US must provide Taiwan with defensive arms.
The law, more critically for Beijing, commits the US to maintaining separate relations with the government of the Republic of China, underscoring the distinct democratic character of Taiwan’s institutions, the fundamental right of its people to self-determination, and the principle that any status solution should be free of coercion.
US policy on Tibet is, similarly, a matter of law. As well as setting out US principles with respect to human rights, refugees, political prisoners and economic development projects in Tibet, the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 established a State Department position of special co-ordinator for Tibetan issues, to oversee policy and programmes, and required an annual report on US support for Sino-Tibetan negotiations.
The act’s principal objective is to encourage Sino-Tibetan dialogue and reflects consistent Congressional pressure on the administration to adopt a pro-active role in this regard. It was such pressure that resulted in George Bush in 1991 becoming the first US president to meet the Dalai Lama and why every president since then has followed suit.
Obama’s decision to meet the Dalai Lama was, then, not “ritualistic”, but rather an expression of long-standing, deeply embedded, US policy. Moreover, in his approach, Obama sought to accomplish some forward movement in Sino-Tibetan engagement. In choosing not to meet the Dalai Lama weeks before the US-China summit in November, Obama had endeavoured to create space for Beijing to consider US advocacy on Tibetan issues. And, while discussions about Tibet at that summit were reportedly less positive than hoped for, his approach did signal his intention to play a constructive role on Tibet.
Patten can be forgiven if he is no expert on US law, but he should be able to hear clearly the escalation of Chinese rhetoric on Tibet and Taiwan, magnified by the repeated assertion that protecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity are “core issues” for Beijing.
Chinese officials have gone on the offensive, for example, to persuade heads of state not to meet the Dalai Lama, arguing that he is a dangerous separatist advocating Tibetan independence. The fact that some European leaders have succumbed to harangues about a man who is renowned around the world as a man of peace and integrity suggests that, in the face of Chinese pressure, Europe can be split between those who do and those who do not choose to adopt an approach that is direct, self-interested and asserts democratic principles.
Those are divisions that underline the relevance of the Lisbon treaty’s goal of developing coherent strategies among member states and consolidating the EU’s influence.
Whatever Obama and the Dalai Lama did or did not achieve for Tibet in their meeting, the meeting was effective as a means of pushing back against the Chinese offensive. That is something that Catherine Ashton, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, will hopefully emulate – and something that Patten, who is well-regarded for his experience and expertise on China, should note.
(Source: Politico)